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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NEW HAMPISHIRE INS·URAN•C'E
COMP'ANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

BALLARD·-WAD'E, INC., M. R.
BALL·ARD, JR., and LQR.AJL,
PETER.SON,

Case
No.10245

Defendants amd Appellwnts.

RESPONDENT''S BRIEF
STATEn1ENT O·F THE KIND O·F CASE.
The case on appeal herein involves an action by
plaintiff against Ballard-Wade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard,
Jr., on a lease wherein plaintiff as assignee of its insured sought to recover from these defendants the
amount expended by it to repair damage to the leased
premises caused by a fire which occurred while an employee of defendants was using the premises in the
course of his employment and in the course of his employer's business.

1
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DIS·POSITION IN LOWER 1COUR!r
The Third Judicial District Court (Judge A. H.
Ellet) ruled as a matter of law that the lease, covering
the damage·d premises, between defendants BallardWade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard, Jr., lessees, and the
Patricia Graff Trust, lessor, plaintiff's insured and
assignor, imposed liability by its t erms against defendants for the damage to the leased premisies. Having
imposed liability upon defendant lessees as a matter
of law, the sole question in the non-jury trial was the
amount of damage sustained by plaintiff. Upon the
conclusion of the trial plaintiff was granted judgment
against defendant lessees for the sum of $4,200.00 plus
interest and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent seeks to have the Supreme ·Court sustain the findings and conclusions and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
S.T'.AJTE1\fENT' OF FACTS
Plaintiff, New Hampshire Insurance Company, is
a corporation authorized to do business in the State
of Utah. (R. 1, 4) Ballard-Wade, Inc., is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business located at
1231 ·South Main Street, Salt Lake ·City, Utah. (R. 110,
T-58) Defendant, M. R. Ballard, Jr., is the president
of Ballard-Wade, Inc. (R. 109, ·T-57); Loral Peterson is
an e1nployee of the corporate defendant and at the time
of the fire loss hereinafter referred to was acting within
2
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the scope of his employment and in the- course of his
employer's business (R. 13). The Patricia Graff T'rust
is the owner of certain real property located at 12'31
South Main Street, Salt iLake 'City, Utah, which property
is insured by a fire insurance policy issued by plaintiff
as the insurance carrier of the Trust ( R. 13).
On November 14, 1955, the Patricia Graff ·T'rust,
by and through its trustees, entered into an agreement
with Ballard-Wade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard, Jr., whereby
the pren1ises located at 1231 S·outh Main Street were
leased to the latter for a period of five ( 5) years. (R.
13, 16-19) ·The premises were to be used exclusively by
the lessee for the operation of a used car sales business
and related business. (R. 17) While in the course of his
employment on March 6, 1961, and while inside one of
the buildings on the leased premises, Loral Peterson
vvas draining gasoline from the gas tank of a customer's
car into a sump on the floor, and in the process of performing this function an explosion occurred resulting in
a fire which totally destroyed the customers automobile
and which extensively damaged the building (See D'eposition of Loral Peterson (pp. 6-10). It is generally thought
that fumes from the gasoline being drained onto the floor
were ignited by the flames from a furnace located in the
same building but placed in a different room.
Pursuant to its obligation under the fire insurance
policy issued by it to p·atrica Graff T'rust, plaintiff re.paired the damage to the leased building caused by the
fire. The cost of repairing the damage was $5,903.96,
which amount 'vas paid by plaintiff (R. 13). As part
3
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of the adjustment of the loss Patricia Graff Trust by
l(irk Graff, one of the Turstees, assigned to the plaintiff
all and any of the rights, claims or causes of action \vhich
the r~Prust had against the defendants for the damage to
the leased premises. (R.72, T. 19, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No.3)
Subsequently, plaintiff initiated this action against
defendants framing the complaint in two counts; the
first count being based on negligence and the second
count being based on liability under the lease.
At the pre-trail plaintiff made a motion to the PreT'rial Judge to declare Paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement between its insured and defendants controlling in
the case and to declare defendants liable for damages to
plaintiff as a matter of law. The motion was denied and
interpretation of the lease was reserved for the Trial
Court. (R. 15)
Before the case was to be tried, it having been assigned to Judge A. H. Ellett for that purpose, plaintiff
moved the Trial Judge to rule on the matters of law, viz.,
interpretation of the lease provisions, \Yhich had been
reserved for the determination of the Trial Judge by
the Pre-Trial Judge. (R. 54, T. 1) Judge Ellett ruled at
that tin1e that the defense of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk asserted by defendants to
plaintiff's first count \Yere not applicable and therefore
not good defenses. (R. 57, T. 4) He also held that P'aragraph 8, the Indemnity Provision of the lease, by its
terms in1posed liability on the corporate defendant and
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l\L R. Ballard, Jr., as signers of the lease, and ruled
that the only question for the trial was damages. ;Thereupon, the Trial Judge dismissed plaintiff's negligence
count and plaintiff proceeded on the indemnity provision
of the lease. ( R. 58, ·T'. 5)

At the trial defendants sought to call witnesses to
show that the Trial Judge's interpretation of the indemnity provisions of the lease was erroneous and that the
parties thereto did not intend the provision to mean
'vhat it said. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the
offer of proof and the Trial Judge sustained the objection
on the ground that such proof was not within the scope
of the issues to be tried. (R. 63, T·. 10)
From the ruling of the Trial Judge and from the
judgment in this action, defendant Ballard-Wa.de, Inc.,
and M. R. Ballard, Jr., appeal.
ARGUME.NT
P·OINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 'THAT
THE LEASE IMPOSED LIABILITY ON THE LESSEE AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

The provisions of the lease agreement out of which
the controversy on appeal arises are as follows:
1. MAIN'T·ENANCE: ·L,essee acknowledges
that he has examined the premises above described, together with the improvements build.
' ac1ngs
and hard surfacing thereon, and further
knowledges that the same are in good condition,
and that he accepts said premises in their present
5
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condition. Lessee agrees at his own expense to
maintain all of said premises, including roof, exterior, interior, plumbing, heating, electrical fixtures and glass in the building on said premises in
a good and useable condition and to maintain the
hard surfacing of the premises in a good and useable condition, and at the expiration of this Lease
or sooner termination thereof to surrender said
premises in as good condition as when received,
ordinary wear and tear, unavoidable damage by
fire, the elements or other casualties excepted.
Lessee may at his own expense remodel said
premises, provided however, that no structural
changes shall be made without the prior written
consent of the Lessor. All improvements made
or added by Lessee (except signs) shall become
a part of said premises and shall remain thereon
at the expiration or sooner termination of this
Lease or any extension or renewal thereof. Lessee agrees to furnish Lessor with space for one
office at the northern end of the building on said
prernises, rent free and utility free (except for
telephone) for the first three (3) years of this
~Lease.

8. INDEMNITY: The Lessee will exonerate,
save harmless, protect and indemnify Lessor from
and against any and all losses, damages, claims,
suits or actions, judgments and costs which shall
arise or grow out of any injury to or death of
persons and/ or damage to property, caused ?Y,
arising from, or in any manner connected w1th
the exercise of any right granted or conferred
hereby, or the use, maintenance, operation and/or
repair of the said premises, buildings, equipment,
machinery and appliance thereon, whether s~s
tained 1 by Lessee or Lessor, 'their xespootive
agents or employees 01: by any other perso~s or
corporations which seek to hold the Lessor hable.
6
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There are sixteen provisions in the lease agreement
dealing with various rights, duties and obligations of
lessor and lessee and the provisions are nl1mhered consecutively and captioned accordingly. Although the
agreement is one for the leasing of real property to
lessor the lease becomes, among other things, an indem'
nity contract by virtue of Paragraph No. 8 thereof.
.

"Indemnity" means reimbursement, restitution, or
compensation for loss, Traveler's Insurarnce Company
vs Georgia Power Company, '51 Ga. App. 579, 18'1 E.
111; National Bank of Monroe vs Wright, 77 Ga. App.
272, 48 S.E.2d 306, 308; Lavar vs M aga~, (~fun. Ct.) 1
NYS 2d 743, 744; Rogers vs Shawnee Fire Insurance
Company of Topeka, 132 Mo. App. 275, 111 S.W. 592,
593, and as such one may contract to indemnify another
for a loss agreed upon and stated in their agreement.
1

In general, there are two kinds of indemnity contract, viz., (1) contract of indemnity against liability, and
(2) a contract of indemnity against mere loss or damage.
A cause of action arises in favor of the indemnitee
against the indemnitor under a contract of indemnity
against liability only when the liability of the indemnitee
arises. However, a cause of action arises in favor of the
indemnitee against the indemnitor under a contract of
indemnity against loss or damage when the loss is suffered by the indemnitee. Duke vs Tyler, 209 Iowa 1345,
230 N.W. 319, 321; Freigy vs Gargaro Company, 223
Ind. 342, 60 N.E.2d 288; Tri-State Casualty Insurance
Company vs Stekoll, 201 Okla. 548, 208 P.2d 545, 549";
42·C.J.8., Indemnity~ 2, p. 565.

7
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Validity and effectiveness of an indemnity provision
or contract does not require that there be a loss by the
indemnitee in the form of a liability over to a third party
or a person other than the contracting parties. In explaining this principle the ·Court said in Board of Insurance Commissioners vs Kansas City Title Insurance
Comp~arny, Tex. Civ. App. 217 S.W. 2d 695, 697:
In a strict sense 'reinsurance' is indemnity
and 'indemnity' is insurance or reinsurance in
so far as each may provide payment for loss or
damage suffered, since to that extent each includes the essential element of reimbursement for
such loss or damage.

Rice vs National Credit Insurance Company, 164 Mass.
285, 41 N.E. 276 (1895) was an action on an account
due (which is irrelevant for purpose of this discussion).
In that case the inde1nnitee had acquired a bond of inden1nity to cover losses to his customers. ·The Court
indicated that no liability of the indemnitee over to third
persons need be shown inasmuch as the indemnitor's
liability arose upon the indemnitee's loss and not his
liability to third parties.
It is a well established principle of contract law
that indemnity agree1nents or contracts are to be construed as any other contract, and that giving words their
legal, natural and ordinary meaning or construction is
controlling where the language is neither technical nor
ambiguous. 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity § 14. Where the
contract is complete on its face and is in plain, simple
and unambiguous language, the rights of the parties
are controlled and 1nust be determined by its language.

8
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420.J.S., Inde1nnity, § 8. Real Estate-Land Title and
Trust Company vs William Cohen Building and Loan
Association, 130 Pa. Super 207, 197 A 511 (19·38). In
llfarks vs NYC Transit Authority, 187 NYS 2d 693, 17
1fisc. 2d 583 (1959) there was a contract between the defendant 'Transit Authority and the third party defendant,
painting contractor, vvhich contained a provision under
which the painting contractor undertook and agreed to
indemnify the Transit Authority. The indemnity provision was clear and definite and was given effect.
Almost all jurisdictions, if not all, have wrestled
with the problem of interpreting or construing indemnity provisions and the rights and duties of the parties
to such an agreement. The ·Court in Southern Pacific
Company vs JJ!orrison-Knudsen Company, 216 Or. 398,
338 P.2d 665 (1959) had this to say:
Since the parties themselves dealt with the
question of indemnity in their written contract,
we think it fair to say ... that they intended it
(the contract) rather than some general common
law rule, to govern their rights and liabilities.
And in speaking of this subject in two other cases,
Russell vs. Lemmons, Oiv. App., 205 S.W.2d 629 (1947)
and Central Surety and Insurance Corporation vs
Martin, Civ. App., 224 S.W. 2d 773 (1949) the Courts
said:
·The nature of appellant's liability on the ind~~nity contract must be determined by its proVISions, following the familiar maxim of law that
as a man binds himself, so shall he be bou~d.
Relative to any contract, including those which con9
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tain indemnity proVIsions, the courts universally say
that the intent of the parties will govern, and the contracting parties are held to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and
signed by them.

Moore vs Standard Paint and Glass, 145 ·c·olo. 151,
358 P.2d 33 (1960) involved the interpretation of an indemnity provision in a lease agreement which said:
". . . Lessor shall not be liable to lessee, its employees
and customers, nor the public for any defect in the
leased premises ... nor for any injury or damage that
may occur from the elements and lessee will hold lessor
harmless from all liability or claims with respect to such
defects or injuries."
On the basis of that part of the provision that states
that the tenant (lessee) would hold the landlord (lessor)
harmless from all liability or claims with respect to
defects in premises or injury or damage occurring from
the elements, the tenant was held liable for damages
caused by the collection of water in the basement of the
leased premises as a result of a cloud burst and flooding
which the lessor had allowed to exist for a considerable
period of time.
The ,C ourt's reason for holding the lessee liable to
the lessor under the circu1nstances was that the terms
of the indemnity provision indicated a clear understanding by the parties that some injury might occur and the
lessor leased the premises only upon the express agreernent of the lessee that the latter would indemnify the
lessor for any and all liability or loss which might occur.

10
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In construing an indemnity provision in a construction contract wherein a subcontractor agreed to indemnify the contractor from all claims of injured parties,
etc., in Brotherton Construction Company vs PattersonEmerson-Comstock, Inc., 178 A.2d 696 (19'63), the Court
attempted to ascertain the intent of the parties. In doing
so it did not restrict itself to the language used in th~
contract but considered circumstances surrounding the
parties and their object in making the agreement. The
Court said:
In construing the agreement, the Court must
ascertain the intention of the parties, and in doing
so it is not confined to the language used, but
may consider the circumstances surrounding the
parties and their object in making the agreement.... They usually intend to provide against
loss or liability of one party through the operation of the other, or caused by physical conditions
which are under the control of the other and
over which the party indemnified has no
control. ...
1

As to the use of extrinsic evidence in construction
of lease agreements and specific provisions contained
therein, the follov1ing cases are representative:

Erickson vs. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102 P.2d 310,
express terms of a 'vritten contract may not be changed
or nullified by parol nor may such parol testimony antecedent to the reduction of the agreement to writing be
considered where the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous. Harvey Machine Company, Inc., vs
li atzel and Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 864, 353 P'.2d 924
(1960) where circumstances of the claimed wrongful con,

11
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duct dictate that damages resulting therefrom were
intended to be dealt with in the [indemnity] agreement,
there is no room for construction of the agreement. It
speaks for itself.

Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. Bybee,
6 Utah 2d 528, 306 P.2d 773 if an ambiguity in a contract
can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of
the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed.
The intent of the parties to the contract should be ascertained first, fro1n the four corners of the instrument
itself, second, from other contemporaneous writings concering the same subject matter, and third, from the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions.
The law, then, in this area is unequivocal. In construing a contract provision one must look to the words
of the contract which reflect the agreement and presumably the intention of the parties thereto. If the contract
is unambiguous, the \vords are given their usual, natural,
and ordinary 1neaning, which it is assumed all average,
reasonably intelligent people know and understand, and
the parties having made their agreement are bound by it.
If a particular provision in the agreement is not clear,
the ,c·ourts then look to the entire contract for assistance
in ascertaining the meaning.
Paragraph 8 of the Lease Agree1nent in question is
an indemnity provision and is so entitled. In clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal terms it states that "the
Lessee \Vill . . . inde1nnify Lessor from ... amy and all
losses (e1nphasis added) ... \vhich shall arise or grow

12
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out of ... damage to property, caused by, arising from,
or in any manner connected with the exercise of any
right granted or conferred hereby, or the use, maintenance operation and/or repair of said premises, buildings,
... whether sustained by Lressee or Lessor, their respective agents or employees or (emphasis added) by
and other persons or (emphasis added) corporations
"vhich seek to hold the Lessor liable." ·The paragraph
sets forth a provision of indemnity against loss by the
Lessor. It clearly states that if the Lessor sustains any
loss or damage to its buildings which loss results from
the exercise of any right conferred under the lease, viz.,
by reason of the use or maintenance of said buildings,
then Lessee will indemnify Lessor for such loss. It becomes necessary to shed the vestment of reasonableness
and under the accepted legal standards of construction to
engage in conclusive mental thrashing to arrive at an
interpretation of this indemnity provision so distorted
as to be able to say it is ambiguous. If it is not ambiguous, the parties are bound by what they agreed to and
defendants were not entitled to produce extrinsic evidence from defendants, or any other source, to vary the
terms of the written contract.
The Trial Judge held that the agreement was unequivocal by its terms and that if Lessor sustained any loss
defendants must indemnify the Lessor or its assj gnees
for such loss, and in doing so he precluded defendants
from introducing oral evidence in an attempt to show
that the provision meant something other than what it
clearly stated. It is plaintiff's position, which is earnest-

13
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ly urged upon the Court, that the Trial Judge did not
err in his ruling.
In attempting to show an ambiguity on the face of
the lease, de-fendants quote the provisions of paragraph
4. They insist that its terms are either inconsistent with
or take precedence over paragraph 8. However, paragraph 4 is a maintenance provision and it is so entitled.
It relates to the upkeep of the premises and the surrender of them to Lessor. 'The important applicable part
of the paragraph is as follows:
". . . Lessee agrees at his own expense to maintain all of said premises, ... in a good and useable
condition, and, at the e~piration of this Lease or
sooner termination thereof to surrender said
premises in as good condition as when received,
ordinary wear and tear, unavoidable damage by
fire, the elements or othe rc.asualties excepted... "
D·efendants assert that since this provision requires
then1 to 1naintain the buildings at their ow'll expense,
except for unavoidable fire, paragraph 8 cannot be construed to impose absolute liability upon them for loss
as an indemnity against loss agreement. Plaintiff cannot agree "\Vith that position for the following reasons:
1. The provision is one relating to maintenance requiring defendants to keep the buildings in their possession or control and "\vhile doing so, to continue to
preserve them in essentially the same condition as when
taken under the lease ;
2. Upon the termination of the lease and after defendants have used the premises and maintained them,

14
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then defendants are to surrender the premises in as good
condition as 'vhen received, unavoidable damage by fire
excepted;
3. If at the termination of the lease, defendants surrender the buildings which had been damaged by an unavoidable fire, it still has a duty to repair, maintain, or
preserve the b~ilding but repairing it under the maintenance aspect of the agreement requires that the buildings be repaired by Lessee at its expense while the surrender of premises terms merely states that Lessee may
surrender the building to Lessor in a damaged state.
There is no implication in the lease that Lessee does
not have to repair for any fire loss. Viewed in light of
this construction of paragraph 4, there c-an be little
question that the two provisions, paragr~ph 4 and paragraph 8, require the Lessee to repair and maintain the
buildings while using them, and upon expiration of the
lease to either repair any damage to the buildings at its
expense or surrender them to 1Lessor in a damaged condition and indemnify Lessor for any damage to the
buildings.
Plaintiff asserts that the lease -agreement is plain
and unambiguous in its terms, that Lessor and Lessee
purposely agreed upon an indemnity against loss by
Lessee to protect property that was part of a trust and
which the Lessor's Trustees had a legal duty to p-rotect.
Plaintiff further urges upon the Court that the Trial
Judge acted properly and did not err in ruling that the

15
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indemnity provision of the lease imposed liability for
loss upon lessor as a matter of la'v and in refusing to
permit oral evidence by defendants to alter the terms
of the lease.

POINT II
THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IS AFFIRMANCE O·F THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The plaintiff, New Hampshire Insurance Company,
having prevailed in the, Trial Court and being of the opinion that no error has been committed, admittedly has
not filed a cross-appeal as defendants seem to think
it should have done. If plaintiff thought its actions in the
lovv-er court \vould have lead the court into prejudicial
error, it should go without saying that it would not have
taken the steps it did while there.
In Point II of its Brief, defendants indicate that the
appropriate relief in this case is to reverse the judgment
of the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for
the Lessee, or, in the alternative, to grant defendants a
ne\V trial. P1aintiffs position is that no error was committed by the Trial Court and consequently its judgment
should be affirmed. In presenting its argument at this
point, in support of its position, plaintiff incorporates
the lavv and argument presented in Point I of the Brief.
As pointed out in the State1nent of Facts, plaiintiff
filed a Co1npla.int for damages against defendants setting forth t\vo counts - one, based on negligence, and the
other, on absolute liability under the lease. Upon the
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ruling by the trial court that the Lease did impose absolute liability on defendants, plaintiff, with the court's
permission, elected to prosecute its claim on the basis
of absolute liability rather than under negligence and
thereupon dismissed the negligence count without prejudice. Therefore, the theory of the case at trial and the
posture of the case on appeal were determined by the
trial court with the urging of plaintiff.
Defendant was not unjustly penalized by not being
able to litigate all issues raised by plaintiff's Complaint
To so assert, under the facts of the case, is to utter the
anguished, Victorian cry of "It's not fair." Since plain.tiff's action was filed, several years ago, defendants have
had the opportunity to answer all issues brought up by
plaintiff's 'Complaint and of presenting and explaining
its position to the court by filing any and all necessary
pleadings, taking advantage of all permitted discovery
techniques, having a pre-trial conference of the case
where all issues were discussed by counsel and the court,
reviewing the lease and its various provisions, and arguing the law in relation thereto to the trial court before
trial of the case, and arguing the law to the trial court
relative to the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show
the meaning of the lease provisions. After having had
these opportunities to answer plaintiff's 'Complaint and
to present its case at trial and rebut plaintiff's case
at the time of trial, upon the ruling of the trial court,
after argument by counsel, disposing of all matters of
law and setting the issues for trial of the matter as is
the prerogative and the duty of the trial court, defendants protest that it was unjustly penalized by not being
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entitled to litigate all issues raised in plaintiff's Complaint. Compelling plaintiff to try the case on the theory
of negligence, even after the court had correctly ruled
on liability under the lease would require plaintiff to
proceed on one count regardless of the merit of another
and would unjustly and unduly burden the parties, counsel, juries, and the court by requiring them to proceed
vvith matters irrelevant to the right of plaintiff to recover from defendants. The courts and counsel are too
busy to engage in such nonsense.

Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the position taken
by defendants in this case and as presented in Point I
and Point II of Appellant's Brief is not well taken.
·Considering the record on appeal, with the exhibits as
part thereof, and the argument contained in its Brief,
Appellant is not entitled to the relief it seeks in this
matter since no error was committed by the Trial Court
in its disposition of this case.
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities,
it appears clear that this court should affirm the judgment of the District ~Court wherein judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff and against defendants BallardWade, Inc., and l\1:. R. Ballard, Jr.
Respectfully submitted,

l{IPP AND CHARLIER
D. Gary Christian, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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